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While the ECB has already taken bold steps, the EU member states 
need to support its eff orts by committing to underwrite together 
some of the fi scal costs of the COVID-19 Pandemic. The best 
option would be to launch a Corona Fund with the power to mobi-
lize 1 trillion EUR—support for such a fund need not be unanimous. 
– Several options are currently on the table: the use of the Euro-
pean Stability Mechanism (ESM), strengthening the European 
Investment Banks and in particular its ability to extend guar-
antees, a backstop for national unemployment scheme with the 
support of the EU budget and borrowing capacity, or the cre-
ation of a Corona Fund with the issuance of coronabonds. 
– The EU could use several of these instruments, but it should not 
limit itself to new instruments with unanimous support or exist-
ing instruments designed for other purposes.
– The most important tool would be a new Corona Fund, which 
could be launched by a limited number of member states and 
run by a new EU Agency. It should aim to deploy 1 trillion euros; 
the fi rst funding would come from one-off  contributions from 
the member states. 
– Then the Corona Fund could receive own resources and be 
allowed to borrow with the backing of either the ESM or bilateral 
guarantees of participating member states. This issuance needs 
to be targeted, temporary, and timely. These resources would 
allow the Corona Fund to make grants to support both member 
states with especially vulnerable health systems or pressing eco-
nomic needs and neighboring non-EU countries as required. 
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At the Eurogroup on March 24, 2020 and in the 
subsequent European Council videoconference on 
March 26, 2020, stark divisions over the need for 
European fiscal solidarity emerged. European heads 
of state and government could not agree a common 
position on the need for European fiscal solidarity 
or on the instruments to be mobilized—they have 
now kicked this discussion back to the Eurogroup. 
President Macron of France and Prime Minister Con-
te of Italy spearheaded a group of nine countries 
(Belgium, Slovenia, Luxembourg, Ireland, Portugal, 
Italy, Spain, Greece and France) calling for the issu-
ance of common debt in response to the coronavi-
rus pandemic and its economic consequences. This 
proposal met with stark resistance, on the one hand 
from the Netherlands, which objected to any form 
of fiscal solidarity, and on the other from Germany, 
which wanted to limit any response to the use of ex-
isting instruments, in particular the European Stabil-
ity Mechanism (ESM). 
In the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, the European 
Union needs to display a much greater sense of sol-
idarity both between its member states and towards 
its neighborhood and developing countries. It should 
prepare the policy instruments that are necessary in 
the short term for a common response and that will 
be required in the medium term to finance the eco-
nomic recovery and avoid a crushing depression. 
Indeed, the EU faces both immediate and medium 
needs that would be best addressed with common 
resources and expenditures. Many German politi-
cal leaders agree in principle on the need for great-
er solidarity, as evidenced by a common letter by the 
Foreign Affairs Minister and Ministry of Finance,1 but 
they disagree about which instruments should deliver 
it. While several groups of German economists have 
called for the creation of a common debt instrument2, 
and lawyers have offered options to make it possi-
ble3, there are still political disagreements prevent-
ing a consensus. The Eurogroup, meanwhile, does not 
seem intent on forcing through a compromise, sug-
gesting this will remain a live discussion for a while.4
1 Heiko Maas and Olaf Scholz, “A response to the corona crisis in Europe based on solidarity,” German Federal Foreign Office, April 3, 2020:  
https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/maas-scholz-corona/2330904 (accessed April 3, 2020).
2 Sebastian Grund, Lucas Guttenberg, Christian Odendahl, “Sharing the fiscal burden of the crisis: A Pandemic Solidarity Instrument for the EU,”  
VOX CEPR Policy Portal, April 5, 2020: https://voxeu.org/article/pandemic-solidarity-instrument-eu (accessed April 6, 2020).
3 Matthias Goldman, “The Case for Corona Bonds,” Verfassungsblog, April 3, 2020:  
https://verfassungsblog.de/the-case-for- corona-bonds/ (accessed April 3, 2020).
4 Mario Centeno, “Interview of Mário Centeno with Süddeutsche Zeitung, Le Figaro, La Repubblica, El Pais and Volkskrant”, European Council, April 4, 2020: 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/eurogroup/president/news/2020-04-04-interview/ (accessed April 7, 2020).
5 “Joint statement of the members of the European Council from 26 March 2020,” European Council, March 26th, 2020: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/
press/press-releases/2020/03/26/joint-statement-of-the-members-of-the-european-council-26-march-2020/ (accessed April 3, 2020).
In the short term, EU member states need resources 
to respond to the health emergency, centralize the 
procurement of critical medical equipment and de-
vices, and assist the economy as it goes into hiber-
nation and workers are confined. But in the medi-
um term, when the health crisis is under control, the 
EU will also need a common economic response in 
order to ensure the speediest and most coordinated 
recovery possible. These instruments need to be put 
in place now: by the end of the health crisis, national 
fiscal policy, having addressed the immediate fallout 
of the crisis, might be straining under the pressure 
and thus operating under more constraints. 
The EU will likely require a common fiscal response 
along the lines of a boosted Juncker Plan/Green 
Deal. A coordinated economic recovery plan would 
also ensure a somewhat level playing field and avoid 
a race to the bottom combining increased state aid 
and cuts in social, regulatory and environmental 
standards. It is important that the economic recov-
ery post-COVID-19 does not come at the expense of 
the climate transition and Europe’s regulatory stan-
dards, but rather helps to support them further.
For the time being, the European Central Bank (ECB) 
has taken the boldest common action. It announced 
a Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP), 
which will buy some EUR 750bn of European Gov-
ernment bonds and commercial paper by the end 
of 2020. Importantly, this program will allow devia-
tion from the ECB’s capital key with regard to both 
the “issuer” limit and the “issue limit”, which had pre-
vented the ECB from buying more than 33 percent 
of a government’s outstanding debt or of a particu-
lar bond issue or a particular country. The capital key 
was a constraint on the ECB’s existing Quantitative 
Easing/Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP). 
Yet there was a widespread expectation that Europe-
an governments would do more than express the re-
quired political support for these measures, that they 
would rise to the moment themselves and deliver 
something heftier than a relaxation of fiscal and state 
aid rules. The European Council5 failed on March 26 
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to agree on a common fiscal response, so it will be 
up to the Eurogroup to propose a set of options to 
European heads of state and government on April 7. 
There are essentially four options on the table:
CONDITIONAL SUPPORT  
WITH THE EUROPEAN STABILITY  
MECHANISM
Most governments will prefer to craft a response on 
the basis of the European Stability Mechanism. The 
problem is that the ESM was fundamentally designed 
to provide assistance in the case of an asymmet-
ric crisis where one or several (but not all) member 
states are losing or are at risk of losing market ac-
cess. By pooling borrowing, the ESM makes it possi-
ble to reduce borrowing costs for the affected mem-
ber states, but it doesn’t formally mutualize debt 
because the member state in need ends up borrow-
ing from the ESM. There is thus a mutualization of 
the borrowing cost but no mutualization of debt.
In addition, the ESM can only operate under condi-
tionality. The Precautionary Conditioned Credit Line 
(PCCL) and the Enhanced Conditions Credit Line 
(ECCL) both allow lighter conditionality than a stan-
dard ESM program, but they require conditionali-
ty6 nonetheless. This conditionality could be staged, 
with only limited conditions at first so that member 
states can access funds now, but tighter conditions 
later to ensure a return to fiscal stability. In addition, 
some member states believe that the Debt Sustain-
ability Assessment (DSA) should remain an important 
part of framing the conditionality over time and not 
only the immediate health challenges. A new facili-
ty could be created, but even this would hardly es-
cape the broad logic of national veto on programs 
and conditionality, which remain the fundamental 
DNA of the ESM.
The German Government has insisted that the ESM 
remain the preferred instrument for intervention. 
It has indicated that its lending could be as large as 
EUR 100bn and that it could be specifically used to 
backstop national unemployment insurance schemes 
and to allow generous partial unemployment/Kur-
zarbeit programs (shorter working hours financed by 
government subsidy) to be undertaken. 
These options are unlikely to find a consensus in-
side the Eurogroup, and if this is the only thing the 
Eurogroup can put on the table, the member states 
in need simply will not use it. Indeed, according to 
the provisions of the ESM Treaty, the Art. 136 in the 
TFEU on which it is based, and the rulings of the 
German Constitutional Court, the ESM cannot be 
used without conditionality. The initial conditionali-
ty could be very light indeed, but the use of an ongo-
ing Debt Sustainability Assessment would allow con-
ditionality to be imposed ex-post when the member 
state needs to start repaying its loan to the ESM. 
Because of concerns about tight conditionality lat-
er, member states will seek to avoid borrowing from 
the ESM if they can avoid it. In addition, the amounts 
that would be made available are too small to real-
ly matter given the size of the expansion considered. 
We are facing not a shock to a single member state 
but a symmetric shock that has brought much of ev-
ery member state’s economy to a grinding halt. The 
concern is thus not about individual borrowing costs 
but about how to pay for a common response, a task 
for which the ESM seems wholly inappropriate.
 Indeed, the ESM would only serve the same objec-
tive as the current PSPP and PEPP programs, but 
in a less effective way because of its more limited 
firepower and unnecessary conditionality at a time 
when concerns about moral hazard do not warrant 
such conditions. More importantly, responding via 
the ESM could undermine the effectiveness of the 
ECB’s instruments by signaling member states’ pref-
erence to make assistance conditional and limited at 
a time when it needs to be potentially unlimited and 
unconditional.
6 Guideline on Precautionary Financial Assistance,” European Stability Mechanism, April 3, 2020:  
https://www.esm.europa.eu/sites/default/files/esm_guideline_on_precautionary_financial_assistance.pdf (accessed April 3, 2020).
The initial  
conditionality of the  
ESM could be very light
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STRENGTHENING THE EIB
One alternative is to strengthen the European In-
vestment Bank’s ability to respond to the econom-
ic shock by providing guarantees, loans, and possi-
bly direct investments and spending to the European 
corporate sector. This could play an important role 
in the recovery phase.
Strengthening the EIB would free up national fiscal 
resources and fully mobilize the EIB’s ability to bor-
row and to extend guarantees. However, given the 
high level of economic uncertainty, it would be eco-
nomically beneficial if the EIB agreed to meaningfully 
relax its investment guidelines on risk taking and to 
considerably expand its capacity to guarantee cor-
porate borrowing. This might require an increase in 
in the capital of the EIB.
The EIB could play an important role, as its borrow-
ing backed by EU member states effectively consti-
tutes an important source of mutualization of the 
European response. However, it is important to note 
that the EIB cannot undertake direct fiscal spending 
and that its role would in fact be limited to financ-
ing public infrastructure or backing the private sec-
tor. While those are certainly important elements of 
an economic recovery package, they would proba-
bly not be suitable for the response to the immedi-
ate emergency. 
A EUROPEAN UNEMPLOYMENT  
INSURANCE BACKSTOP BUILT ON  
THE EU BUDGET AND ITS 
ABILITY TO BORROW
The European Commission is working on loans 
from the EU budget to back national unemployment 
schemes.7 This funding would allow each member 
state to expand its insurance scheme and encourage 
the use of Kurzarbeit and other partial unemploy-
ment schemes. While it would not allow any trans-
fers or mutualization, this option would allow the EU 
to issue common debt. (This scheme would, howev-
er, be based on loans from the EU at a time where no 
member state is having trouble borrowing money.)
In fact, the EU already issues “Eurobonds” backed 
by the EU budget. Three facilities are used to issue 
common debt8: (i) the European Financial Stabili-
ty Mechanism (EFSM), which can issue up to 60bn 
and lend it to EU member states, (ii) the Balance of 
Payment facility, which can borrow up to 50bn and 
lend it to non-Euro Area member states experienc-
ing a balance-of-payments crisis (usually alongside 
the IMF) and finally (iii) the Macro Financial Assis-
tance facility, which can be used alongside IMF pro-
grams for non-EU countries.
The total borrowing capacity of the EU is, however, 
constrained by the resources ceiling of the European 
Budget. There are several ways to increase the bor-
rowing capacity of the EU budget, such as increas-
ing the Own Resources Ceiling Directive, for exam-
ple by including new potential resources (perhaps a 
carbon border adjustment tax, a tax on plastics, or an 
increase in Emission Trading Scheme revenues…), or 
by raising the size of the guarantee fund that allows 
the EU budget to  borrow. These options need not 
necessarily lead to an increase in expenditure, but 
they would allow the EU to borrow more and create 
a new borrowing facility entirely controlled by the 
European Commission. 
In principle, such an agreement would be superior 
to options one and two, both in terms of firepower 
as well as in the design of collective policies. How-
ever, this option requires unanimity by the Coun-
cil and would have to be effectively reflected in the 
new Multi Annual Financial Framework. The Ger-
man Government seems keener to design this unem-
ployment insurance support through the ESM rath-
er than through the EU budget. It will be important 
to see whether the Commission and others allow this 
process to take place through an intergovernmental 
rather than community approach.
7 “European Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of a European instrument for temporary support to mitigate 
unemployment risks in an emergency (SURE) following the COVID-19 outbreak (leaked),” Politico.EU, April 1, 2020:  
https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/SURE-Regulation-clean.pdf (accessed April 3, 2020).
8 “Investor Presentation: January 2020,” European Commission, January 2020:  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/economy-finance/eu_investor_presentation_en.pdf (accessed April 3, 2020).
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A TEMPORARY, AD-HOC  
INSTRUMENT ABLE TO MUTUALIZE  
RESOURCES AND ISSUE CORONA- 
BONDS: A CORONA FUND
All of these options have something going for them. 
But given the intractable divisions on this matter 
and the urgency of the economic crisis, it is import-
ant that the EU consider more flexible instruments. 
The goal should be to allow a coalition of the will-
ing to move forward even in the absence of unani-
mous agreement now, but to keep the door open for 
all willing member states to participate later. By tak-
ing the following steps, the EU could bypass unanim-
ity rules and empower a coalition of the willing to 
create a new form of common shared resources and 
common borrowing: 
I. Create a Corona Trust Fund with all willing mem-
ber states. Since 2013, the new Financial Regulation 
governing the EU budget has allowed the Commis-
sion to administer a fund to respond to major chal-
lenges and specific needs. In addition, the European 
Treaty foresees in its Article 222 a solidarity clause 
that offers options for member states to act jointly 
“to provide assistance to another EU country which 
is the victim of natural or man-made disaster” and 
allows them to resort to the use of an EU Solidarity 
Fund9. Trust Funds and the Solidarity Fund are vol-
untary vehicles, and member states can contribute 
financial resources to pursue a common policy ob-
jective. Article 187 of the 2012 Financial Regulation al-
lows for the creation of a Trust Fund, although such 
funds were initially intended to support the EU’s 
external actions. In this case, the fund would have 
both an external component (assistance to develop-
ing countries) as well as an internal solidarity com-
ponent. This fund could be first endowed by volun-
tary, one-off contributions from the member states 
of EUR 10-20bn, but its resources would need to be 
able to expand over time.
II.  Task the Commission with establishing a new 
EU Agency to coordinate the actions of the mem-
ber states taking part in the Corona Trust Fund and 
transform the Trust Fund into a vehicle for deliver-
ing financial assistance. In order to use Article 352 as 
the legal basis for this, three conditions must be ful-
filled: (i) there must be no other legal basis in the Trea-
ties for the action, (ii) the action must be within the 
framework of Union policies, (iii) it must be neces-
sary to attain a Treaty objective (in this case Article 4 
(k) of the TFEU10). The Commission could on that ba-
sis extend financial assistance under Article 122(2) 
TFEU and implement it through Article 120 of Regula-
tion 2018/1046). The EU agency created need not in-
clude all member states—think of the Single Resolution 
Board, which is an EU agency but only includes mem-
ber states taking part in the Banking Union. 
III.  Establish, through an intergovernmental 
agreement11, new own resources for the Corona 
Trust Fund, which would then become a Corona 
Fund and would no longer depend on exception-
al contributions of member states. Its resources 
could be a small portion of VAT or a special tax on 
air travel (for the single resolution fund, it is a levy 
on banks).
IV. Authorize the Corona Fund to borrow on the basis 
of the own resources committed to it and with the 
additional backing of:
• A backstop from the ESM12, very much along the  
 lines of the SRF backstop from the ESM.
• A set of bilateral guarantees13 from the  
 participating member states to serve as credit  
 enhancement on top of the stream of own  
 resources along the lines of the EFSF.
V. Ensure that the funds issued by the Corona Fund, 
like national debt or supranational debt (EIB, ESM, 
EFSF), are eligible for ECB refinancing and asset pur-
chases operations .
9 The EU Solidarity Fund was established in 2002. The Fund has been mobilized for more than 56 disasters covering a range of different catastrophic 
events including floods, forest fires, earthquakes, storms and drought. 
10 The Union shall share competence with the Member States where the Treaties confer on it a competence which does not relate to the areas referred to 
in Articles 3 and 6 such as (k) common safety concerns in public health matters, for the aspects defined in this Treaty. See “Consolidated Version of TFEU”, 
Official Eu Journal, September 5th, 2008:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12008E004&from=EN (accessed April 3, 2020).
11 Member States could use the precedent and drafting of the intergovernmental agreement establishing the Single Resolution Board and the transfer 
and mutualisation of contributions to the single resolution fund. See “Agreement on the transfer and mutualization of contributions to the Single 
Resolution Fund,” Council of the European Union, May 14, 2014:  
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%208457%202014%20INIT (accessed April 3, 2020).
12 This has not come into force, but the draft guidelines for the ESM to serve as backstop to the SRF could be used here. See “Draft Guideline on the 
Backstop Facility to the SRB for the SRF,” European Council, December 4, 2019:  
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/41668/20191206-draft-backstop-guideline.pdf (accessed April 3, 2020).
13 The early agreement on the EFSF provides a template for the use of bilateral guarantees to ensure proper joint debt issuance with the highest possible 
rating. See “ETSF Framework Agreement,” ETSF, November 10, 2019:  
https://www.esm.europa.eu/sites/default/files/20111019_efsf_framework_agreement_en.pdf (accessed April 3, 2020).
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Not all of these steps can be secured at once and 
they will all be subject to challenges, but they are 
all legally and political possible provided there are 
enough member states willing to go ahead. Impor-
tantly, because such a Corona Fund would be entirely 
embedded in EU law, the European Institutions 
would have to side with those member states that 
support it, rather than its detractors. 
How much could a Corona Fund raise? That largely de-
pends on the length of the crisis and the depth of the 
shock, but a flexible instrument of this nature would 
enable the mobilization of around EUR 1 trillion with-
out much difficulty. The more countries that decide to 
take part, the better and the more solid the financial 
construct, rating, and borrowing capacity would be. 
But even a small coalition of the willing could start.
PROPOSED BY SUPPORTED BY TYPE AMOUNT  
IN EUR
LEGAL BASIS
Coronavirus  
Solidarity Fund
Shahin Vallée - Common Issuance of 
a coalition of willing 
Member States
1,000 bn Art. 352 /222 
TFEU
Pandemic Solidarity 
Instrument
Sebastian Grund 
et al.
- Common Issuance 440 bn Art. 12 TFEU
Corona Bonds IT, FR, ES, SL,  
BE, LU, IR, GR, 
PT 
Common Issuance - -
Corona Fund FR FR Transfers/grants and 
Common issuance
- -
European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM)
410 bn Art. 136 TFEU
Enhanced  
Conditions Credit 
Line (ECCL)
Loans
Ad-hoc Covid  
Credit Line
Agnes Bénassy 
et al.
Loans
Unemployment  
Insurance Loans
German Federal  
Ministry of  
Finance (BMF)
DE Loans 100 bn
Unemployment  
Insurance (SURE)
European 
Commission
EC Loans to national 
budgets
100 bn Art. 122 TFEU
EU Budget/ mul-
tiannual financial 
framework (MFF)
European 
Commission
ALL EU Budget 37 bn
Corona Transfers 
via EU Budget
Daniel Gros - Recurrent Transfers  
from EU budget
-
One-off-Transfer 
Fund
NL NL One off Transfers from 
National budget
10-20 bn
European Fiscal Options to Respond to the Corona Pandemic
Source: Author's own compilation
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A Corona Fund would bypass the unanimity require-
ment, which is both a strength—because it permits 
fast action—and a weakness. Critics will argue that a 
fund without unanimous support could cause a po-
tential fragmentation within the EU or the euro ar-
ea and create a precedent that weakens the currency 
union. However, the risks of fragmentation are limit-
ed as long as it is clear that this vehicle is temporary, 
and that the associated transfers are limited to the 
coronavirus crisis. The ECB would have to commit to 
treat these bonds as it would treat national or Euro-
pean supranational bonds. In fact, rather than divid-
ing the EU, the coalition of the willing could convince 
all member states to eventually participate over time.
Politically, going down this path could be an import-
ant departure from the current French strategy of 
systematically trying to negotiate a bilateral Fran-
co-German agreement before pushing any Euro-
pean initiative. However, this approach has showed 
its limits. For the French, embracing transnation-
al politics and coalition building could be a new way 
to force Germany to take a clear stand and limit its 
delaying and veto power. It would potentially erode 
Germany’s own support among the EU’s more fis-
cally hawkish countries, as is already visible with the 
weakening of the Hanseatic league. 
But while it is a risky strategy and could lead to a 
more profound deadlock and divided Europe, it is a 
chance worth taking so long as the ECB is prepared 
to continue to backstop the member states that par-
ticipate in it. The real dangers for the unity of the 
Euro Area are not so much associated with forming 
a coalition of the willing; they lie rather with inac-
tion that erodes the affectio societatis that ties Eu-
rope together, or with ECB inaction that could be the 
real source of financial fragmentation. These are the 
two most important risks worth fighting against. 
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